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Highlights
• The international dimension of an emissions trading system 
(ETS) pertains to the capacity of its regulation to produce 
economic and environmental effects overseas, whether through 
the linkage with other systems or by leading by example.
• A result that the Paris Agreement has already achieved is the 
revival of positive prospects for the international carbon market. 
International cooperation, including through carbon market 
integration, is expected to be a means for achieving the goal of 
climate stabilisation. 
• The EU ETS is likely to have a pivotal role in the prospective 
processes of carbon market integration.
• Integrating ETSs is generally a lengthy process. Deep carbon 
market cooperation is necessary to prepare and implement the 
linkage of ETSs and subsequently to manage the new system.
• There is likely to be a growing demand for more streamlined 
procedures for preparing and managing carbon market inte-
gration processes. Shared knowledge, mutual trust and trans-
parency among the institutions involved are preconditions to 
achieve, but further learning is needed to facilitate the subse-
quent steps of those processes.
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1. Introduction
While remaining today the world’s largest Emis-
sions Trading System (ETS) in operation, the EU 
ETS covers 5% of global greenhouse (GHG) emis-
sions. Thus, the success of the EU ETS – in a broad 
sense – also depends on its contribution to fostering 
stronger climate mitigation action outside Europe. 
However, how this contribution may materialise is 
not independent of the wider relevant context. The 
Paris Agreement (PA) has established a new interna-
tional climate change regime that clearly promotes 
international climate cooperation. In many cases, 
this will take the form of carbon market cooperation. 
A result that the PA has already produced is indeed 
the revival of positive prospects for the interna-
tional carbon market. Expectations are that carbon 
pricing (i.e. carbon taxation and emissions trading) 
will spread further across the world and that carbon 
markets, including the EU ETS, will move towards 
greater integration. 
Against this backdrop, the international dimension 
of the EU ETS has regained relevance. International 
cooperation with jurisdictions that already run an 
ETS or intend to set up one is high on the EU’s cli-
mate agenda. The Florence Process, which the Euro-
pean Commission started in 2017 in collaboration 
with the Florence School of Regulation (FSR) Cli-
mate, is an important initiative strengthening coop-
eration among regulators and stakeholders of the EU 
ETS and of other major operating and prospective 
ETSs.
 The policy brief is organised as follows. Section 2 
provides information explaining the significance of 
“international dimension of the EU ETS”, today. Sec-
tion 3 outlines the theory of clubs as a framework for 
understanding carbon market cooperation. Section 
4 reports on the Florence Process so far. Section 5 
concludes.
2. Contours of a Topical Subject
References to “international climate cooperation”, to 
“carbon markets” and their “international dimen-
sion”, are increasingly frequent within and beyond 
the climate policy domain. We try and connect the 
dots to explain the essence and the rise of the subject 
as well as the role of the EU ETS. 
What Does International Dimension of an ETS Mean? 
Though a domestic ETS on its own can function per-
fectly, its integration with other systems is always an 
option. This is the case because of the aggregate eco-
nomic gains, and the possible ensuing environmental 
gains, that can be achieved by creating a larger ETS. 
Accordingly, any jurisdiction with an ETS will nor-
mally ponder the benefits and the risks of linking 
with other systems. Even an autarkic ETS, however, 
can produce effects beyond its borders. This occurs, 
for instance, if an ETS becomes a model to follow, 
which means that its implementation encourages 
the creation of new ETSs or inspires regulatory 
changes in already existing ones (Wettestad and Gul-
brandsen, 2018). Whether through the linkage with 
other systems or by leading by example, the regula-
tion of an ETS can produce economic and environ-
mental effects overseas. The international dimension 
of an ETS pertains to this capacity.
Why do we Increasingly Hear About Climate 
Cooperation?
Two factors explain why international climate coop-
eration is, today more than ever, an issue of public 
debate: the nature of the PA regime and the need to 
raise the ambition of climate mitigation efforts. The 
PA reflects a hybrid approach blending bottom-up 
and top-down features (Chan et al., 2018). The first 
relate to the freedom of the Parties (nations) in set-
ting their “Nationally Determined Contributions” 
(NDCs) to climate mitigation and in choosing the 
policies for meeting their commitments. The second 
refer to the obligations that the Parties have, such 
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as monitoring and reporting duties among others. 
Article 6 of the PA promotes cooperation between 
Parties in order to achieve the respective NDCs. The 
linkage of ETSs is one possible form of cooperation, 
in the specific sense of the PA (i.e., in relation to the 
NDCs), which several countries, and also subna-
tional jurisdictions, might want to use in the future1. 
By reducing the cost of meeting the NDCs, coop-
eration has the potential to induce greater mitiga-
tion efforts2. Raising ambition is imperative because 
the sum of the initial NDCs falls short of what is 
required to keep the global temperature rise within 
2°C above pre-industrial levels (UNEP, 2017). A 
defining feature of the PA is indeed a “ratchet mech-
anism” whereby, every five years, collective progress 
is assessed and individual NDCs can be revised only 
in the direction of more aggressive mitigation. Inter-
national cooperation is thus expected to be a means 
for achieving the ultimate goal of climate stabilisa-
tion.
What is the Value of Carbon Market Cooperation?
After multi-decade long experience with carbon taxes 
and ETSs in advanced economies, the cost-effective-
ness of carbon pricing, relative to command-and-
control approaches for climate mitigation, seems 
to be widely recognised. Over 80 national govern-
ments have declared that they intend to use carbon 
pricing for meeting their NDCs (Marcu and Suga-
than, 2018). Consistent with this revelation of policy 
preferences, the count of operating ETSs around the 
world has increased, reaching 21 (at different levels 
of government) in early 2018 (ICAP, 2018)3. The 
prospect of seeing several ETSs in the future, some 
1.  Mehling et al. (2018) illustrate how also climate policies other than ETSs could be linked for the purpose of minimising the 
cost of meeting the NDCs.
2.  It has been estimated that, by the middle of this century, an international carbon market has the potential to reduce global 
mitigation costs by over 50% (WB, Ecofys and Vivid Economics, 2016).
3.  When China’s national ETS will enter in operation, about 15% of global GHG emissions will be covered by domestic ETSs 
(ICAP, 2018). 
4.  https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/markets_en 
of which would be linked to each other, has quickly 
become real. Integrating ETSs is generally a lengthy 
process, however. Deep carbon market cooperation 
undertaken by the relevant authorities is necessary 
to prepare and implement the linkage of ETSs and 
subsequently to manage the new system (Santikarn 
et al., 2018). Moreover, carbon market cooperation 
not aimed at, or not resulting in, the establishment 
of a larger integrated ETS can still be valuable and 
convenient for the parties leading the process if it 
eventually induces stronger mitigation action.
What is the Role of the EU ETS?
The EU ETS is likely to have a pivotal role in the 
prospective processes of carbon market integration. 
Four factors underpin this expectation: a) the size of 
the EU ETS, making it a major player in the inter-
national carbon market; b) the number of countries 
participating in the EU ETS, which implies a strong 
track record in negotiating different interests; c) the 
experience accumulated by the EU in managing the 
system through various regulatory challenges; and 
d) the will of the EU to keep a leading role in global 
climate action. In fact, the EU has always looked after 
the international dimension of the EU ETS. Relevant 
experiences are the incorporation of Norway, Ice-
land and Liechtenstein (EFTA countries) in the EU 
ETS, the linkages with Australia (failed) and with 
Switzerland (now pending ratification), the recogni-
tion for compliance purposes of international emis-
sion credits generated by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementa-
tion, but also the capacity building programmes for 
the creation or development of ETSs abroad (e.g., 
China, Korea4). For the reasons explained, the new 
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PA context and the need to increase climate miti-
gation efforts have relaunched the international 
dimension of the EU ETS.
3. The Theory of Clubs Applied to Carbon 
Market Cooperation 
Climate mitigation is a perfect example of global 
public good: the resulting avoided damages of cli-
mate change are a non-rivalrous and non-exclud-
able good throughout the world5. The problem with 
public goods is the connected incentive to free-ride 
on the efforts of the others; that is, not to contribute 
to the joint effort, or to contribute less than the 
social optimum requires (Ostrom, 2015). The classic 
approach for addressing this problem stems from 
the theory of clubs. A club is “a voluntary group 
whose members share a set of benefits from which 
non-members are excluded” (Buchanan, 1965). In 
the climate policy context, the formation of climate 
clubs is a way for overcoming free riding in interna-
tional climate agreements. The club strategy involves 
limited-membership regimes that produce or secure 
economic or other non-climate benefits accruing to 
participants in return for their stronger mitigation 
action. Examples of such benefits are, among others, 
access to R&D or financial programs (Carraro, 2016) 
or access to preferential trade arrangements (Nord-
haus, 2015).
An extended concept of climate clubs allows clas-
sifying different observed forms of climate coop-
eration. Stewart et al. (2017) distinguish between 
“classic clubs”, “pseudo clubs”, and “coalitions”. The 
classification is based on the relevance of the club 
benefits and the degree to which non-club members 
can be excluded from their fruition. While classic 
clubs provide clear and readily excludable benefits, 
pseudo clubs provide benefits that are more diffuse, 
less readily excludable, and potentially less easily 
5.  A good is non-rivalrous if its consumption by one consumer does not prevent its consumption by others. A good is non-ex-
cludable if non-paying consumers cannot be prevented from accessing it. 
6.  E.g., the Carbon Disclosure Project (www.cdp.net). 
quantifiable. An example are the reputational ben-
efits of companies participating in carbon meas-
urement and disclosure programmes6. Importantly, 
pseudo clubs without government regulation will 
not move from monitoring emissions to enforcing 
emission reductions (Green, 2017). Climate coali-
tions are effectively further-diluted arrangements. 
They generally offer information- or publicity-
related benefits, while requiring limited or no real 
environmental commitments (Weischar et al., 2012).
Carbon market clubs are a type of classic climate 
club. Their specificity is in emission trading being 
the mandated approach for cooperatively pursuing 
the mitigation objective. Writing before the PA 
regime could be imagined, Ellerman (2010) sug-
gested that the formation or extension of interna-
tional carbon markets necessitate the provision of 
club benefits beyond those connected to market 
participation. On the same question, Keohane et al. 
(2017) present a more optimistic view which is con-
sonant with the new context and the related expecta-
tions. The authors envision the formation of a club 
of linked carbon markets that countries would want 
to join without additional incentives. The club, as an 
autonomous institution, would need to: a) create the 
conditions for mutual recognition of emission units 
among members; b) maintain the market infrastruc-
ture necessary for trading; c) establish clear criteria 
for membership; and d) inform assessments of miti-
gation effort and ambition among current and pro-
spective members. An historical example of how 
such a club could be initiated and operated is, from 
the realm of international trade, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.
4. The Florence Process
In September 2017, the FSR Climate, in collabora-
tion with the European Commission’s Directorate-
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General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), organised 
a workshop on the international carbon market. The 
workshop, which took place at the European Uni-
versity Institute, gathered the regulators of the EU 
ETS (DG CLIMA) and other major ETSs, those of 
California-Quebec, China and New Zealand, as well 
as researchers, officials from international organi-
sations, representatives of the business sector and 
NGOs7. In effect, the event was the start of a policy 
dialogue which saw its second round, also in the 
form of a workshop, in May 20188. The first two 
rounds of the dialogue, which has been named Flor-
ence Process, have laid the foundation for future 
deeper cooperation among the regulators. 
The early stage of any carbon market cooperation 
process cannot but involve, for the participating reg-
ulators, building trust in the relationships with the 
counterparts and learning about the functioning as 
well as the past and perspective challenges of the other 
ETSs. Accordingly, part of the first two workshops of 
the Florence Process was dedicated to information 
sharing about a) the features of the ETSs represented, 
b) the issues recently faced and the corresponding 
regulatory responses, and c) relevant aspects of the 
national public debates. Importantly, however, the 
dialogue also focused on some fundamental areas of 
ETS regulation, with analyses and view exchanges of 
both regulators and stakeholders. Among the topics 
that received attention were the rules for the free 
allocation of emission allowances (concerning, e.g., 
benchmarking, free allocation aligned with produc-
tion trends, tiered carbon leakage status), the use of 
auction revenues, and the admissibility of emission 
offsets for regulatory compliance.
The landscape of the ETSs participating in the Flor-
ence Process was and remains characterised by het-
erogeneity in several aspects of ETS design, such as 
7.  http://lifesideproject.eu/event/carbon-market-workshop/ 
8.  http://fsr.eui.eu/event/second-carbon-market-workshop/ 
9.  For details, see ICAP (2018).
10.  https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2016/10/canadian-approach-pricing-carbon-pollution.html 
sectoral coverage, allocation method, market sta-
bility mechanisms and regulation of emission offsets, 
among others9. Not only is the landscape heteroge-
neous, in the sense explained, but it is also dynamic. 
For example, a major reform of the EU ETS for its 
Phase IV (2021-2030) became law in March 2018, 
right in between the first two workshops of the Flor-
ence Process; again in the EU ETS, the Market Sta-
bility Reserve – a novel approach for dealing with 
allowance supply-demand imbalances – will start 
operating in January 2019; in Canada, all 13 prov-
inces and territories are required to have carbon 
pricing schemes in place by the start of 201910, though 
the plan of the federal government has encountered 
some strong political opposition at the local level; in 
2017, the Canadian province of Ontario linked its 
ETS with that of California-Quebec, only to leave 
this year by will of the new government; finally, in 
December 2017, China announced the launch of its 
forthcoming national ETS. 
Discussions in the Florence Process are foreseen to 
continue in 2019.  ETS regulators and stakeholders 
will have the opportunity to inform and be informed 
on the latest developments from the respective juris-
dictions, to learn from each other and, ultimately, to 
take a step forward in the cooperation process.
5. Concluding Remarks
Cooperation for climate mitigation, as regulated 
under Article 6 of the PA, is not only a key com-
ponent of the international climate change regime. 
More important, it is an enabler, and perhaps a con-
dition, for the achievement of the PA’s climate miti-
gation objective. Cooperation is intended to reduce 
the cost of achieving the NDCs and, thereby, allow 
stronger mitigation efforts. Considering the strength 
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of emissions trading, that is, cost-effectiveness in 
reducing emissions to a targeted level, and the pre-
disposition of an ETS to integrate with similar sys-
tems, there is little doubt that carbon market coop-
eration will be central in the coming years. 
Nevertheless, uncertainty remains as to how, in 
concrete terms, carbon market integration will be 
carried out in efficient ways. Relatively extended 
experience with integration of carbon markets has 
been accumulated, primarily in Europe and North 
America, but new challenges are ahead. Past ETS 
linkages mainly involved two jurisdictions at a time, 
they concerned jurisdictions with similar economic 
structures, and tended to be lengthy processes. In 
the future, there is likely to be a demand for more 
streamlined procedures for preparing and man-
aging carbon market integration processes. So far, 
researchers have devoted little attention to how these 
processes should be informed and whether there are 
forms of cooperation that could provide synergies 
and mutual benefits for existing ETSs in the short 
to medium term. Shared knowledge, mutual trust 
and transparency among the institutions involved 
are preconditions to achieve, but further learning is 
needed to facilitate the subsequent steps of carbon 
market integration processes.   
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